

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5885

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 176

USMISSION BERLIN

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

USDOCOSOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 HELSINKI 0861

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: CSCE: BILATERAL WITH SOVIETS MARCH 31 - STATUS  
OF MPT WORK AND RELATED ISSUES

FROM USDEL MPT

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

BEGIN SUMMARY. MENDELEVICH MADE STRONG PITCH THAT SOVIETS  
NEEDED PRECISE COMPROMISE ON INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS  
BEFORE EASTER BREAK. VEST INDICATED THIS WAS UNREALISTIC  
EXPECTATION SINCE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS NEEDED BREAK TO  
ASSESS OVERALL STATE OF PLAY AND TO REXAMINE KEY SUB-  
STANTIVE ISSUES. ON SECURITY QUESTIONS, MENDELEVICH  
ADVOCATED COMPROMISE FORMULATION ON SOURCES OF PRINCIPLES  
LIMITED TO " PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER."  
DURING DISCUSSION OF " MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS" HIS  
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MANNER HINTED AT POSSIBILITY OF SOME SOVIET FLEXIBILITY. HE ANTICIPATED NEED FOR MINIMAL LANGUAGE ON " OTHER MILITARY MEASURES" TO MEET INTERESTS OF NEUTRALS. ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, MENDELEVICH DISPLAYED INTEREST IN FINDING QUICK COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. ON HUMAN CONTACTS ( BASKET III) HE INTIMATED THAT IF WEST COULD FIND MODERATE WAY TO REFER TO SOVEREIGNTY AND NON- INTERFERENCE IN INTRODUCTION TO MANDATE, REST OF BASKET III WOULD " GO MORE EASILY. " HE WAS REALISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR CONFERENCE FOLLOW- ON ( BASKET IV) AT THIS STAGE BUT SAID SOVIETS WOULD WANT ONE WORKING GROUP SESSION ON SUBJECT BEFORE BREAK. HE SUGGESTED FURTHER US- SOVIET BILATERAL BEFORE BREAK AND RAISED POSSIBILITY OF MEETING WITH KUZNETSOV DURING PODGORNYY VISIT TO HELSINKI. END SUMMARY.

1. VEST GAVE LUNCHEON FOR AMB MENDELEVICH AND SOVIET DELOFF SHIKALOV MARCH 31 TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON MPT PROGRESS THUS FAR AND ON REMAINING ISSUES. ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL AND US AND SOVIET ASSESSMENTS OF TACTICAL SITUATION APPEARED CLOSE.

2. PRINCIPLES. MENDELEVICH OPENED WITH STRONG PITCH HE NEEDED TO RETURN TO MOSCOW FOR EASTER BREAK WITH AGREED COMPROMISE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD MEET SOVIET CONCERNS ON PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS. OTHERWISE, HE FEARED POSSIBILITY OF NEGATIVE MOSCOW REACTION OVER SOVIET FAILURE TO PIN DOWN THIS KEY POINT, WHICH MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD OTHER BASKETS. VEST FRANKLY SAID IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT CONCRETE COMPROMISE ON INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS BEFORE THE BREAK SINCE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS DURING EASTER BREAK WOULD FIRST HAVE TO REEXAMINE THEIR POSITIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE OVERALL STATE OF PLAY AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES ON KEY ISSUES WHICH EMERGED FROM THIS PHASE OF MPT. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO DEVELOP AS COMPLETE PICTURE BEFORE THE BREAK AS POSSIBLE. MENDELEVICH ACCEPTED THIS EXPLANATION IN GOOD GRACE.

3. SOURCES OF PRINCIPLES. MENDELEVICH REITERATED THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT ACCEPT REFERENCE RESTRICTED TO UN CHARTER, FRIENDLY RELATIONS DECLARATION, AND SIS DECLARATION AS SOURCES OF PRINCIPLES. FRG, ON OTHER HAND, CANNOT  
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ACCEPT INCLUSION OF REFERENCES TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ( I. E. BILATERALS). HE SAW TWO ALTERNATIVES: TO AVOID ANY MENTION OF SOURCES OR TO INCLUDE A GENERAL REFERENCE TO " THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER," NOT AS THE SOURCE FOR WORKING OF THE PRINCIPLES BUT AS BASIS FROM WHICH PRINCIPLES ARE DERIVED. HE THOUGHT THIS FORMULATION WOULD IN THE END BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRG BECAUSE IT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS ENCOMPASSING THE IDEA OF THE TOTALITY OF THE PRINCIPLES ( I. E. THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP).

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INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 177  
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USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
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4. CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. VEST EXPLAINED AGAIN OUR GENERAL VIEW THAT " MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS" WILL BE LARGE, NOT CONCEALABLE AND THUS PRIOR NOTIFICATION WILL HAVE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR SMALLER POWERS. MENDELEVICH EXPRESSED INTEREST IN EXPLANATION. HE NOTED YUGOSLAVS HAD USED WORD " RESTRAINT" ON MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND MANEUVERS IN THEIR PROPOSAL ON CBM' S ( HELSINKI 847) AND SAID HIS INITIAL REACTION WAS POSITIVE

IF THIS WORD WAS TAKEN AS IMPLYING SELF- RESTRAINT. HE OBSERVED THAT THE WORD " RESTRAINT" HAD CROPPED UP REPEATEDLY AT US- SOVIET SUMMIT IN MOSCOW AND COULD BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT ONE SIDE WOULD AGREE NOT TO ENGAGE IN MANEUVERS THAT WOULD BE VIEWED PROVOCATIVELY BY THE OTHER.

5. ECONOMIC COOPERATION. MENDELEVICH STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF MFN AND NON- DISCRIMINATION TO SOVIETS IN CONTEXT THIS BASKET BUT INDICATED SOVIETS DID NOT EXCLUDE ALTERNATIVE  
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AMBIGUOUS, BUT REASSURING FORMULA CONVENING SUBSTANCE OF THESE CONCEPTS. HE MADE PARTICULAR POINT THAT HE RATHER THAN ZORIN WAS PREFERRED CHANNEL FOR EXPLORING SUCH COMPROMISES.

6. HUMAN CONTACTS. MENDEL VICH SAID KEY ISSUE IN BASKET III WAS NOT FAMILY REUNIFICATION, CULTURAL COOPERATION, OR OTHER SPECIFIC POINTS BUT FACT THAT INTRODUCTION TO MANDATE NEEDED TO CONTAIN CONCEPT THAT EXCHANGES IN THIS AREA SHOULD NOT AFFECT EXISTENCE OF VARIOUS SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND SHOULD BE BASED ON RESPECT FOR PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NON- INTERFERENCE. HE NOTED THESE POINTS HAD BEEN CONCEDED BY VARIOUS WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN THEIR STATEMENTS BUT WERE NOT REFLECTED IN NEW DANISH DRAFT MANDATE. IF THESE IDEAS COULD BE WORKED INTO INTRODUCTION HE THOUGHT DISCUSSION OF OTHER ASPECTS OF MANDATE " WILL GO MORE EASILY."

7. CONFERENCE FOLLOW- UP. MENDELEVICH SAID SOVIETS NEEDED FOR COSMETIC REASONS AT LEAST ONE WORKING GROUP SESSION DEVOTED TO BASKET IV BEFORE EASTER BREAK. HE ACCEPTED WITHOUT ARGUMENT, HOWEVER, VEST'S OBSERVATION THAT WESTERN ALLIES WOULD NATURALLY HAVE LITTLE TO SAY SINCE THEY CONTINUED TO VIEW QUESTION OF CONFERENCE FOLLOW- UP AS MORE LOGICALLY ADDRESSED AT LATER STAGE IN CONFERENCE.

8. MEETING WITH KUZNETSOV. MENDELEVICH NOTED FIRST DEPUTY FONMIN KUZNETSOV WOULD BE IN HELSINKI DURING FIRST WEEK OF APRIL IN CONNECTION WITH PODGORNYY VISIT TO FINLAND AND TENTATIVELY RAISED POSSIBILITY OF VEST MEETING WITH KUZNETSOV. VEST SAID HE WOULD OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE IF KUZNETSOV WISHED TO SEE HIM.

9. NEXT BILATERAL. BOTH SIDES AGREED ON DESIRABILITY OF FINAL " WRAP- UP" BILATERAL JUST BEFORE BREAK, SUBJECT TO UNCERTAINTIES CAUSED BY PODGORNYY VISIT.  
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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* LIMDIS

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL

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